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If we know anything about John Lilburne, it is that, as one of the most important political 
radicals of the mid-seventeenth century, he was acutely conscious of being English, and of 
the need to defend the rights and liberties of freeborn Englishmen. As such, it might seem 
odd to suggest that we need to think again about Lilburne’s Englishness, and yet this chapter 
focuses on a brief but intriguing episode in his life – the time he spent in the Low Countries 
between his banishment in January 1652 and his return to face trial and imprisonment in June 
1653 – precisely in order to correct some pervasive misapprehensions about his attitudes 
during the republic, and to reassess the pride he took in his homeland. This episode is 
obviously well known, and yet it also tends to be glossed over rather briefly by Lilburne’s 
biographers, and it has not been analysed very rigorously or understood entirely adequately, 
and the reason for subjecting it to closer scrutiny is to shed new light on Lilburne, as well as 
on neglected dimensions of his ideas about political and constitutional reform, not least by 
placing his comments from this period in the wider context of seventeenth-century 
radicalism.1 The problem with this particular chapter in Lilburne’s life, therefore, is not just 
that it has been used to develop a highly problematic argument that he was prepared to 
collude with royalists, but also that an opportunity has been missed to recognise that he – like 
others – learnt from his experiences of, and reflections upon, the Low Countries. As such, the 
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aim of this chapter is threefold. First, it seeks to examine the evidence about his exile in the 
Low Countries, using royalist correspondence, republican propaganda and Lilburne’s own 
pamphlets, in order to assess the nature and strength of his links with exiled cavaliers. 
Secondly, it seeks to explore the ways in which Lilburne responded to the challenges that he 
faced in the Low Countries by using pamphlets to address a variety of audiences, both 
English and European, and both friendly and hostile. Thirdly, it seeks to evaluate what light 
this period, and these texts, can shed on Lilburne’s attitudes towards the Dutch republic, and 
towards its system of government. The argument will be not just that it is possible to question 
the idea that Lilburne became some kind of ‘royalist’ after his banishment from England, but 
also that he found it necessary and useful to deploy printed pamphlets in rather unusual ways, 
and in order to address not just English radicals but also exiled royalists and his Dutch hosts. 
Ultimately, it will be possible to suggest that even this most English of political radicals was 
inspired by the example that had been set by the Dutch republic, which served in important 
and overlooked ways as a model for constitutional reform in England, and that Lilburne also 
provides an example of the ways in which political strategies, and the uses of print, became 
much more complex and creative in a situation where political cultures of England and the 




Lilburne’s experience in the Low Countries in the early 1650s is generally discussed in terms 
of his fraught relations with the republican regime, with Sir Arthur Hesilrige and with Oliver 
Cromwell, in relation to both his personal affairs – the property he claimed had been taken 
from him – and his outspoken political position. It was this complex situation which resulted 
in Lilburne being accused of treason and then expelled him from England, and it is said to 
have led to his conspiring with royalists in order to kill Cromwell and overthrow the Rump.2 
However, while Lilburne certainly knew and consorted with royalist exiles – such links were 
discussed explicitly in Lilburne’s own pamphlets – the surviving evidence needs to be 
handled with considerable care, not least in terms of royalist attitudes towards the Leveller 
leader and the role of republican propaganda.  
 First, while Lilburne’s arrival in the Low Countries was observed with interest by 
leading royalists, it is not clear that he was universally welcomed or taken very seriously as a 
possible ally. Writing in late February 1652, therefore, Richard Watson explained that 
Lilburne and some of his ‘tribe’ had arrived on the Continent, but his first thought was that 
the old Leveller was not to be trusted, and he added that ‘I have a jealousy that his 
banishment is but counterfeit, to give him an opportunity of doing mischief in Holland’. 
Clarendon, meanwhile, could barely bring himself to pay Lilburne even back-handed 
compliments, explaining to Sir Edward Nicholas merely that Lilburne would make a better 
neighbour than the Earl of Roxburgh, of whom the king was said to have had a deservedly 
bad opinion.3 In June 1652, moreover, Clarendon expressed his reservations by noting that 
‘Lilburne is not without reputation with some great persons here, as well as with you’, and 
that ‘I am thought an obstinate fool for not understanding that he will ever be able or willing 
to do good’. Indeed, it soon became clear that Lilburne’s royalist contacts were largely 
confined to the so-called ‘Louvre group’, an assortment of Catholics and pragmatists who 
pursued a controversial policy of joining forces with Scottish Presbyterians, and from whom 
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Nicholas and Hyde sought to distance themselves. More particularly, they bemoaned the fact 
that it was men like the Duke of Buckingham who became particularly close to, and perhaps 
even ‘governed by’, the ‘infamous John Lilburne’, adding somewhat mischievously that 
Buckingham was ‘the fittest man for those transactions’.4 Buckingham, of course, was a 
highly unorthodox and unpopular royalist, who had fallen out of favour with Charles II, and 
who devised all sorts of implausible schemes for uniting royalists with republicans – and 
indeed with France and Rome – against Cromwell. At the same time, however, he was also 
attempting to make his peace with Cromwell, and may even have spied for the English 
government. Later, of course, he would consort with other dissidents and radicals in the late 
1670s. It is thus significant that it was with Buckingham in particular that Lilburne held 
‘close consultations’ in July 1652, resulting in the two men having ‘some design in hand’ to 
kill Cromwell, ‘on whom Lilburne will be revenged’.5 Indeed, it was this particular 
relationship that seems to have lasted, notwithstanding the reservations of Hyde and 
Nicholas. In May 1653, therefore, Nicholas suggested that Bishop John Bramhall was ‘very 
great and intimate… with the rogue Lilburne, who boasts very much of his friendship and 
power with the Duke of Buckingham’, while in June 1653 Hyde explained to Nicholas that 
Buckingham had been ‘much in council’ with Lilburne at Calais, in the belief that he had ‘no 
little interest’ with the ex-Leveller.6 
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 Secondly, it is important to recognise that the association between Lilburne and the 
royalists may have been prompted by, and was certainly exploited by, the Rump regime, and 
by its chief intelligencer and propagandist, Thomas Scott. Although the nature of Scott’s 
operation in the Low Countries remains murky, it seems clear that spies were set to watch 
Lilburne in exile, and to report on his activities. During the early months of his banishment, 
therefore, stories about Lilburne appeared fairly regularly in the official newspaper, 
Mercurius Politicus, and Lilburne certainly claimed to have exposed more than one of the 
characters involved.7 Chief amongst these was Captain Wendy Oxford, who was accused of 
having been hired by Scott in order to bring about his ruin, and who may even have been 
subjected to a mock prosecution in order to give him a fake Leveller identity, thereby enabling 
him to follow Lilburne around Europe.8 Lilburne bemoaned, therefore, having had ‘too much 
cause confidently to believe’ that a plan had been hatched to get Oxford to accompany him 
into exile, ‘the more securely to get me murdered in our travels together’.9 Indeed, the 
scheme seems to have worked, to the extent that royalist onlookers made the connection 
between the two men; Sir Edward Nicholas explaining to Hyde in May 1652 that Oxford, 
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‘when he first came from England, was a great companion of your friend Lilburne, but they 
of late seem to be fallen out’.10  
 Lilburne’s interpretation of Scott’s strategy was not entirely consistent over time, but 
it certainly involved the idea that Oxford was engaged in a variety of subtle schemes, not all 
of which were necessarily compatible. On one occasion, therefore, Lilburne suggested that 
Scott’s aim was to use Oxford to fool royalists into believing that he supported their cause, 
thereby ‘to gull and cheat the credulous cavaliers’.11 On another occasion, he claimed that 
Oxford sought to convince exiled royalists that parliamentarians were ‘traitors against the 
king’, adding that his ‘constant plotted dissembling devices’ were intended to ‘exasperate the 
body of the mad and ranting cavaliers in these parts to cut my throat’. Yet another theory was 
that Oxford’s goal was ‘to make the people of Holland believe my banishment was but a 
counterfeit, a juggling and dissembling fictious thing, out of design, that so I might be the 
more serviceable to the general, or my brother traitors at Westminster… [and] that so the 
people in Holland might beat my brains out as a rogue, an one of the generals or parliament’s 
chief spies’.12 Moreover, whatever the reality of Oxford’s mission, Scott’s aim was certainly to 
discredit Lilburne at home. In March 1652 he may have been responsible for peddling stories 
that Lilburne had been made ‘captain of a man of war for the states of Holland’, with ‘power and 
instructions to fire, sink or take any ships whatsoever, that shall be declared enemies to the 
United Provinces’.13 Another story, from December 1652, lumped Lilburne together with men 
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like Major General Edward Massey and Sir Marmaduke Langdale, and implied that all three had 
made approaches to the Dutch, with whom England was then at war, apparently in the hope of 
facilitating a Dutch victory, not least in order to further their hopes of restoring Charles II. The 
author of this report claimed that Lilburne was ‘very active, and great is the concourse of people 
towards him’, adding that he had ‘set forth a declaration, touching the liberty of the people, and 
the freedom of nations, which gives ample satisfaction to the states’.14 
  Such stories, which have the ring of black propaganda, may have been circulated 
surreptitiously by the republican regime, and it is perfectly clear that Scott was willing to 
publicise intelligence gathered by English spies, alongside information from Lilburne’s 
intercepted correspondence. Some such evidence appeared, therefore, in a tract called Severall 
Informations and Examinations, which was timed to coincide with Lilburne’s trial in July 1653 
and dispersed throughout the army, and which did more than anything else to cement the idea 
that he had associated with exiled royalists.15 It contained evidence, for example, from Isaac 
Birkenhead, one of the spies that Lilburne himself identified, who referred to ‘very desperate 
enemies of all sorts to this commonwealth, with whom I observed Lieutenant Colonel Lilburne 
much to associate’. Birkenhead outlined not just Lilburne’s ‘great correspondencies’ with 
England, therefore, but also his links to Buckingham and Lord Hopton, to whom he apparently 
offered to destroy Cromwell and restore Charles II in return for £10,000. According to Captain 
John Titus, meanwhile, Lilburne had not only held meetings with Buckingham, but also boasted 
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to Hopton of his many ‘agents’ in England, and of his ability to ‘instigate the people against the 
parliament’. Yet another witness, John Staplehill, claimed to have seen Lilburne, his wife and 
Buckingham ‘very familiar’ with each other at the Silver Lyon in Calais in June 1653, not least 
in conversation about Cromwell.16 
That such allegations were hugely damaging is evident from the vehemence of 
Lilburne’s response. On 15 July, therefore, mid-way through the legal proceedings against him, 
he replied to Several Informations in a work called Malice Detected, claiming that ‘no stone 
hath been left unturned, no stratagem unattempted, to render me odious, and fit for death, in the 
esteem of my friends, my jury, and the Parliament’. Denying the allegations made against him, 
moreover, Lilburne claimed that Scott’s spies had lied in order to curry favour with the regime, 
that the work was ‘full of the most abominable falsities that ever proceeded from the wicked 
heart of the falsest man’, and that ‘its poison’ was intended to ‘insinuate itself into the 
understanding of men without any possibility of an antidote’. For Lilburne, however, the real 
significance of Several Informations was that it was ‘a stratagem of a new nature, and far 
unsuitable to the way of true Christians, to print against the prisoner under trial, such particulars 




Given the prevalence of such claims about Lilburne’s activity in the Low Countries, it is 
obviously necessary to pick our way through the evidence with some care, and doing so 
makes it possible to develop a rather different picture of both his activity and his aims. 
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 The place to start is with Lilburne’s known movements after his banishment. This can 
be done in part through contemporary newspapers, whose editors capitalised on his notoriety, 
as well as through the observations of contemporaries and Lilburne’s own statements. We 
know, therefore, that Lilburne was given thirty days to leave England on 15 January 1652, 
and that, although he found it difficult to travel without an official pass, he reached Dover at 
the end of the month, where he was reported to have made a public speech before embarking 
for Europe.18 According to his own account, Lilburne arrived at Ostend on 8 February 1652, 
from where he apparently sent ‘several letters of compliance… unto several of his clandestick 
friends here in England, wherein he much complains of the severity of his banishment, 
desiring them to use their endeavours for his restauration, accounting it a thing easy, and 
within their power’.19 From there he apparently passed through Flushing, Rotterdam and 
Middelburg before reaching Amsterdam in late February, where he settled in Holy Way 
Street, apparently in the house of Miss Mezar in Sheep’s Alley.20 Thereafter, it was said that 
he ‘lyeth very private, not daring to adventure himself much abroad openly’, and in the 
absence of hard news journalists may have resorted to using their imagination. One editor 
claimed that ‘those whom he trusteth most are some few acquaintances of his of the Jewish 
synagogue, who have privately entertained him’, while Nedham added that ‘the talk is that he 
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is very busy writing, but what they know not’.21 We can be somewhat more confident, 
however, that Lilburne presented a petition ‘to the magistrates of this place’, in the hope of 
securing their protection, and that he was able to correspond with his wife, Elizabeth, in 
England.22 In the end, however, Lilburne did not stay very long in Amsterdam. As early as 15 
April 1652 it was reported that he found ‘but small encouragements to stay here, so that tis 
talked he intends to remove’, and by May he was living in Vianen, ‘that pleasant city of 
refuge’, a few miles south of Utrecht and just outside the United Provinces.23 Indeed, despite 
subsequent reports that Lilburne had returned to Holland, he probably spent the rest of his 
exile in the Spanish Netherlands, most obviously in Bruges, where he found a ‘beautiful 
dwelling’ through an English friend called Mr Lambert, and from where he departed for 
England, via Dunkirk and Calais, in late May or early June 1653.24 
 This is a rather skeletal picture of Lilburne’s activity in the Low Countries, but it 
nevertheless helps to explore the challenges that he faced. In part, these were financial, and 
Lilburne claimed that he was ‘forced in a land of strangers, for many months together, to 
borrow… every penny that brought me bread’, although Wendy Oxford claimed that he 
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received weekly contributions from ‘his brotherhood and faction in England’.25 More 
obviously, Lilburne faced very real threats to his safety, and he not only suspected a plot to 
kill him as he first made his way to Amsterdam, but also felt threatened thereafter by ‘the 
rudest sort of cavaliers’, who apparently threatened to ‘Dorislay’ him, and who prompted his 
plea for protection from the Dutch authorities.26 Lilburne claimed, indeed, that ‘all my brains, 
valour and mettle hath been scarce able several times to preserve my life, from the murderous 
hands of the various plots, and their greatly deluded credulous accomplices’.27 Such dangers 
are only likely to have increased as political tensions rose between the two republics during 
1652, and Lilburne’s departure from Amsterdam was a very logical move once war broke 
out. 
 More importantly, such difficulties also provide the context for, and make sense of, 
Lilburne’s writing and publishing during his exile, not least during a brief printed battle with 
Wendy Oxford. Lilburne was evidently ‘very busy looking after a printing press’ as soon as 
he arrived in Amsterdam, and in March 1652 he produced the Letter to his Dearely Beloved 
Wife, and this was quickly followed by his Apologetical Narration, which appeared from the 
same press in April 1652, and by a tract called As You Were.28 In Leiden, meanwhile, Oxford 
produced A Prospective for King and Subjects, which was dedicated to Charles II, as well as 
The Unexpected Life and Wished for Death of the thing called Parliament in England, which 
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in turned prompted the appearance of L. Col. John Lilburne Revived (March 1653), Oxford’s 
Vincit Qui Patitur, or Lieutenant Colonel John Lylborne Decyphered (April 1653), and then 
Lilburne’s Defencive Declaration, the latter of which appeared in May 1653, shortly before 
he returned to London. Such works saw Lilburne accuse Oxford of printing with the ‘advice 
or consent’ of Thomas Scott, while Oxford denied that he was an English spy and claimed 
credit for prompting Lilburne’s departure from Amsterdam, but more important than the 
trading of such blows is evidence of the strategy that Lilburne pursued in response to 
Oxford’s machinations.29 
 First, therefore, Lilburne’s pamphleteering involved continuing his propaganda effort 
in England, not least in order to reassure those allies who would doubtless have been alarmed 
by allegations regarding his flirtation with royalists, and not least by demonstrating that he 
continued to ‘stand up against oppression, to propagate the Gospel, to preserve the liberty of 
the people, and to maintain the laws of the land in its purity without corruption or bribery’.30 
According to evidence presented against him by Captain John Tutus, therefore, Lilburne 
boasted that  
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I’ll set my press on work (for which purpose I have bought one with a letter to 
Amsterdam, which cost me £30) and then I’ll send my papers over into England, 
which by my agents shall be spread all over the nation, and by my agents (for I have 
enough) my papers shall be brought into the army there… and as soon as these papers 
are spread they’ll fly in the faces of their officers, so that with the help of my 
particular interest, the soldiery shall do all themselves, and I’ll do nothing but sit in 
my chair and use my pen.31 
 
Thus, Lilburne’s Letter to his Dearely Beloved Wife contained a familiar assault upon the 
republican regime, in which readers were invited to reflect on what safety there would be in 
England once Cromwell’s will became law, and when ‘he is faster riveted in his unlimited 
and a thousand times more than kingly power’. Lilburne railed, moreover, that ‘the House of 
Commons may bear the name of things, but in reality it is but his screen, he alone himself as 
to man, being the alpha and omega of all their chief results’.32 In his Defencive Declaration, 
meanwhile, Lilburne dealt explicitly with Scott’s campaign against him. He drew attention, 
therefore, to spies like Hugh Riley, whom he described as ‘one of Mr Scot’s great agents and 
negotiators beyond the seas’, despite being ‘a common reputed Irish rebel, and lately a piece 
of a quarter master general to Sir Charles Lucas in Colchester’, and who ‘for his most 
villainous roguery, cheating, cozening, treachery and running from one side to another, hath 
several times hardly escaped hanging in Flanders’. Lilburne also described Oxford’s wife – 
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one of Scott’s go-between’s – as little more than ‘a common notorious reputed whore’.33 
More importantly, he also felt compelled to respond to allegations that he had become a 
cavalier, ‘or at least a mighty great man with the chief leaders of the king’s party here’, which 
he said were being peddled by Scott and his agents, ‘even at Parliaments [and] committees’.34 
Indeed, this determination to deliver public explanations to his natural constituency – as ‘a 
rational security to my person’ – explains why Lilburne sought to ensure that the pamphlets 
he produced in exile were conveyed to London, in order that they might be reprinted and 
distributed by Hugh Peter, Henry Marten, John Lambert and Robert Bennet. Lilburne 
Revived, therefore, was described as being ‘for the use of England’, while the Defencive 
Declaration not only appeared in Amsterdam, in May 1653, but was also reprinted, in an 
expanded form, in London.35 As he explained after his return to England, moreover, 
Lilburne’s aim in exile had been to make ‘clear demonstrations’ of his ‘true affection to my 
native country’, to ‘its liberties and freedoms’, and to ‘the way of a commonwealth rightly 
constituted’, even while he was ‘daily struggling with the complotted designs of my death, by 
the barbarous, wicked and most vile agents of Master Thomas Scot’.36  
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At the same time, however, the fact that Lilburne printed such works in the Low 
Countries also indicates that he had an eye on other English exiles. This no doubt reflected 
his awareness that such people had access to a range of English texts, and Lilburne referred to 
having seen in Amsterdam ‘a printed Act of Parliament’ relating to his banishment, 
‘expressed in the notablest of English newsbooks, called Mercurius Politicus’, as well as to 
the fact that copies of Clement Walker’s History of Independency were ‘openly and 
avowedly’ sold at the Hague.37 In this context, moreover, Lilburne’s most obvious target 
involved local royalists, not least out of a concern for ‘the safety of my life’.38 He explicitly 
reacted, therefore, to the way in which Oxford had ‘writ and caused to be printed several 
books, with his name to them, proclaiming in foreign nations’ that both the army and the 
parliament were ‘traitors against the king’, and he recognised that ‘the main and evident 
scope of all his said books and constant plotted dissembling devices and actions’ was ‘to 
exasperate the body of the mad or ranting cavaliers in these parts to cut my throat’. Lilburne 
also claimed that Oxford had ‘constantly made it his work to incense the whole body of the 
king’s party beyond the seas against me, constantly averring that I have been the only 
principal man that embroiled the three nations in war, that murdered the king, and altered the 
government into a commonwealth, and have destroyed the king, his queen and posterity’, 
adding that, as a result, ‘my life hath been in a constant and perpetual danger to be taken from 
me, especially by the rasher and madder sort of the king’s party’.39 
As such, it seems clear that Oxford’s pamphlets, and the evidence being gathered by 
Scott’s spies, placed Lilburne in an extremely awkward position. On the one hand, failing to 
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reply to them would mean that he would ‘tacitly grant the truth’ of claims that were being 
made regarding his radical hostility to the Stuarts, and thus run the risk of provoking royalist 
assaults on his person. On the other hand, reassuring royalists that he was trustworthy might 
mean that he would ‘lose my interest in England’, which was ‘the thing they so much 
desire’.40 Being thus caught between a rock and a hard place, in the face of claims not just 
that he had become a royalist but also that he was a dangerous enemy to monarchy, 
Lilburne’s pamphleteering represented an attempt to address a range of English readers, 
including both radicals at home and royalists abroad, and an attempt to ‘counterbalance… 
two destructive evils and mischiefs against me, and my life’.41 His solution, therefore, was to 
produce a carefully calibrated account of his relationship with those royalists he encountered 
in the Low Countries. Lilburne explained, therefore, that it was this awkward situation which 
underpinned his decision to develop ‘a friendly familiarity with the rationalest and 
principalest of the king’s party’, including Lords Percy, Hopton and Culpeper, as well as 
Bishop Bramhall and the Duke of Buckingham, with the latter of whom he claimed to have 
dined at Oxford’s chambers in Amsterdam, and with whom he claimed to be ‘the most 
conversant’. At the same time, Lilburne was also at pains to deny that he was in league with 
such men, adding that his discussions focused largely on facilitating Buckingham’s return to 
England.42 Elsewhere, moreover, he claimed that ‘if John Lilburne being banished did hold 
affinity or correspondency with malignants being beyond the seas, yet he betrayed no trust 
reposed in, or unto him’, adding that he could not be ‘blamed for what he said or did beyond 
the seas’. Indeed, having been made ‘an alien and stranger to England’, and placed ‘in the 
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condition of an enemy’, Lilburne claimed to have been released ‘from all the obligations, 
duties and performances of an Englishman’, and left ‘free in himself to act for himself either 
with or against those that banished him, as he pleased’.43  
What makes Lilburne’s printing in the Low Countries all the more intriguing, 
however, is that at least some of the texts he produced in Amsterdam – including the 
Apologetical Narration – were printed, in a somewhat innovative fashion, in bilingual 
editions, with parallel texts in both Dutch and English.44 As such, it can be assumed that 
Lilburne was also addressing a Dutch audience, and indeed he himself boasted of having 
sought to translate his texts into French and Latin, for publication across northern Europe. In 
The Upright Mans Vindication, therefore, Lilburne explained that it was his confidence about 
Cromwell’s intransigence that led him to get 1,000 copies of his Defencive Declaration 
published ‘in these parts’, in Dutch as well as English, as well as to get another copy printed 
in Latin, and a copy sent ‘immediately’ to Paris, in order that an Anglo-French version might 
be ‘speedily’ produced.45  
In other words, Lilburne was seeking to address a wider European audience, and here 
too his publishing strategy was complex but explicable. Consistently, therefore, Lilburne 
made clear that his writings were intended ‘to apologize for himself unto the Netherlanders, 
by laying open the true state of his late fine and banishment eternal from his native countrie’, 
to respond to the claims that were being made about his activities, and to reassure the Dutch 
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about his intentions.46 This was why the Apologetical Narration was ‘directed to the people 
of the United Netherlands, the place of his present abode, wherein the judicious reader will 
observe diverse mysterious passages of state in reference to the present condition of affairs in 
England’, and why it consisted, in large part, of yet another re-working of his 
autobiography.47 Lilburne replied, therefore, to evidence that ‘some imagine me here to be a 
spy for the commonwealth’. This, he explained, was not merely a problem in terms of threats 
from ‘the mad or ranting crew of the cavaliers’, who ‘enquired’ after him ‘as a traitor and 
rogue’, but also in terms of the reaction of his Dutch hosts, especially in the event of war.48 
Moreover, in detailing his life story and the circumstances surrounding his banishment, 
Lilburne hoped to convince the Dutch ‘that the parliament hath banished me in good earnest 
and intended it as the greatest mischief to me… and never in the least by the whole or any 
part of them intended it as a cloak or colour to enable me the better to be a spy for them’.49 
Lilburne later reiterated this point, indeed, by insisting that one of Wendy Oxford’s aims had 
been ‘to make the people of Holland believe my banishment was but a counterfeit, a juggling 
and dissembling fictious thing, out of design, that so I might be the more serviceable to the 
general, or my brother traitors at Westminster’, and so that ‘the people in Holland might beat 
my brains out as a rogue, an one of the generals or parliament’s chief spies’. As such, 
Lilburne’s response to Oxford involved using ‘discourses and print beyond the seas, to make 
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it evident and apparent to the people there that my banishment was a real thing, and no 
fiction… and that I was so far from being a spy for the general’.50 
  What seems clear, indeed, is that Lilburne’s determination to convince the Dutch of 
his honourable intentions was driven in no small part by the worsening relations between 
England and the United Provinces, in the wake of the failed proposals for closer union and 
the passage of the Navigation Act. That Lilburne was acutely aware of mounting tension is 
evident from a letter to his wife in March 1652, where he explained his need to consider the 
possibility of a war, and it is thus notable that, in April 1652, Lilburne professed to the Dutch 
his desire for ‘a quiet and peaceable abode in your land, while I walk honestly, civilly and 
peaceably, without meddling… with any of your affairs in the least’. Indeed, it is also striking 
that Lilburne was prepared to go a long way in order to convince the Dutch of his Leveller 
credentials, and thus of his opposition to the republican regime, only a matter of weeks before 
the first skirmishes of the Anglo-Dutch War. Thus, while seeking to reassure the Dutch that 
he was a leveller ‘of propriety and magistracy’ – and to point out that the name Leveller was 
devised by Cromwell and ‘his crafty son Ireton’ at Putney, as part of the attempt to ‘blast and 
baffle’ their arguments, and to ‘render their persons odious in the eyes of the people of 
England’ – Lilburne also sought to ensure that key texts – from Putney Projects to the 
Manifestation (14 April 1649) and the final Agreement of the People (1 May 1649) were also 
‘translated into Dutch’.51 
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 Of course, the challenges involved in addressing and convincing three distinct 
audiences simultaneously were profound, and in the context of worsening diplomatic 
relations between England and the United Provinces Lilburne was not entirely successful. 
Indeed, it was his attempt to convince Dutch about both his credentials and his intentions that 
ultimately helped to bring about his departure from Amsterdam. In reporting that Lilburne 
found ‘small encouragements’ to stay in Amsterdam in mid-April 1652, and that he ‘intends 
to remove’, Politicus rightly noted that this was a response to his having ‘taken a course to 
disperse those books he calls his Apologie’, adding that copies were ‘seized by particular 
order from the Burgomasters’, much to Lilburne’s surprise and consternation. According to 
Politicus, indeed, the aim was ‘to let him know they could not permit him to print them here, 
their intention being to use all means to preserve amity with the state of England’, and it 
seems clear that, in the tense weeks before the outbreak of hostilities, the Dutch could not 
afford to run the risk that Lilburne was a spy, or to be seen to protect so notorious an enemy 




Such evidence suggests that we need to be cautious about overplaying Lilburne’s ‘royalism’ 
in exile, while also recognising that he faced serious if understandable difficulties in the 
United Provinces, and not just because he thought himself ‘too old’ to learn the language.53 
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At the same time, however, caution is also required in assessing Lilburne’s response to this 
situation and to his Dutch hosts. Thus, while Politicus claimed that Lilburne became 
disillusioned and petulant, by noting how he indicated that ‘if they would not permit him to 
print here, he would go where he might have that liberty’, the reality may have been 
somewhat different. Lilburne himself claimed to have ‘acquiesced’ to the ban on his printing, 
and to have refrained from publishing other works ‘till such time’ as he could ‘obtain licence 
to print avowedly what in that kind I have to say’. Thus, while Lilburne claimed to have been 
forced to ‘spend much money and time to travel and look out for myself, where safely to 
abide and print without offence’, he also recognised that the Dutch decision was probably 
inevitable in the current diplomatic context, and his departure was more obviously provoked 
by his sight of Parliament’s declaration of war against the United Provinces.54 Indeed, while 
the differences between this account and that offered in Politicus might be regarded as subtle, 
they are probably of vital importance for a more accurate assessment of Lilburne’s attitude 
towards the Dutch republic. 
 What emerges, therefore, is that even though Lilburne expressed a desire to ‘breath in 
England’s air, in peace, security and quietness’, and exclaimed that ‘I long to see London’, he 
also showed genuine respect for the Dutch Republic.55 He referred to it as ‘the common 
receptacle of wearied, tossed and banished men, being a place… of the greatest freedom that 
I have ever read or heard of’, adding that Amsterdam was ‘more famous for freedom, and 
flourishing thereby, more than all the rest’.56 In March 1653, moreover, Lilburne made clear 
that, ‘although I am very much an Englishman, yet I am… no enemy to Holland and its 
                                                 
54 Politicus, 97, p. 1536; Lilburne, As You Were, p. 33; Severall Informations, p. 9. 
55 Lilburne, Upright Mans, p. 26; Severall Informations, pp. 10-11. 
56 Lilburne, Apologetical Narration, pp. 2, 21. 
welfare, but desire with all my heart an honest and a just peace betwixt them and England’.57 
Indeed, Lilburne’s subsequent writings made it perfectly clear not just that he himself still 
had much to teach England – and that this could only be achieved ‘if you get me home in 
safety, and thereby free me from the murderous dealings of Mr Thomas Scot, and his cursed 
and blood-thirsty associates’ – but also that such lessons were informed by his time in 
Holland. Indeed, Lilburne’s comments were sometimes explicitly framed in terms of how 
England needed to imitate the Dutch in order to emulate their glory and the fortunate 
situation in which Dutch citizens found themselves. From the Dutch, therefore, Lilburne 
learnt how to ‘ease the people of three quarters at least of their present charges in taxes and 
excise’, and he also sought to show how England could  
 
 provide for all the old and lame people in England, that are past their work, and for all 
orphans and children that have no estate nor parents, that so in a very short time there 
shall not be a beggar in England, nor any idle person that hath hands or eyes, by 
means of all which the whole nation shall really and truly in its militia be ten times 
stronger, formidabler and powerfuller than now it is. 
 
This was explicitly aimed at the proud and passionate English reader, and those that ‘love 
your own welfare, and the welfare and happiness of the land of your nativity’, and it was such 
people who Lilburne implored to ‘act vigorously, stoutly, industriously and unweariedly 
night and day for the preservation of your own interest, liberties and welfare’.58 
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 Such comments – which involved learning from, and emulating, a Dutch model – 
make even more sense when placed in the context of Lilburne’s circle of friends and 
supporters, and indeed of seventeenth century radicalism more generally. One pro-Lilburne 
statement from 1652, for example, demanded a ‘publique banck’, along Dutch lines.59 More 
obviously, Lilburne’s comments can usefully be placed alongside those of his friend, Hugh 
Peter, whose Good Work for a Good Magistrate set out ideas for social, economic and 
educational reform, the unifying theme of which was that ‘though Holland seem to get the 
start of us, yet we may so follow, as to stand at length upon their shoulders, and so see 
further’. Peter advocated new methods for setting the poor and sick to work, where 
‘Amsterdam is far advanced’, and suggested following a Dutch model in relation to the 
execution of justice, the use of cheap loans and the creation of banks. He also suggested re-
modelling London in order to improve the ‘profit, pleasure and ease’ of its inhabitants, as 
well as its economic fortunes, and here too the model was Dutch. Peter suggested that the 
streets should be widened and paved, ‘as in Holland’, and made ‘high in the middest with the 
gutters on both sides, and bricks on both sides next the houses, as in Holland’, adding that 
houses should be remodelled ‘as at Amsterdam’. London also needed to be made much 
cleaner, and Peter found there ‘most beastly dirty streets, the hurt of which is so great, as is 
strange, and what a world of work is daily made by the dirt and wet, in rotting of shoes and 
stockings, women’s coats, fouling of houses, making clean of shoes, clothes etc’. Here too, 
therefore, he noted that it was ‘strange and not possible for merchants to live cleanly, and 
neatly, as in Holland, without cleaner streets’. In addition, Peter advocated better measures 
for preventing fire, with water pumps, ‘bored into the ground… as in Holland, as well as new 
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quays for ships in Southwark, ‘as at Rotterdam’.60 Earlier in the century, moreover, another 
radical pamphleteer – the prolific and controversial Thomas Scott – likewise advocated 
reflecting on the United Provinces and ‘considering her ways’, in order to ‘learn to be wise’ 
by using the Dutch as ‘tutors’. Scott explicitly argued that Dutch ‘customs and orders’ ought 
to be ‘translated into our commonwealth’, including their treatment of the poor (with 
almshouses ‘maintained at the public charge of the state or the cities’), their tax system, their 
justice, their architecture, and indeed ‘the general willingness of their hearts to advance any 
public work either for necessary use or ornament, wherein they are a people beyond 
comparison forward and liberal’, and wedded to ‘the common good’.61 
More importantly, for both Peter and Scott the ‘virtuous emulation’ which was being 
advocated extended to issues of ‘politique government’. Scott, for example, observed ‘a 
general freedom permitted and used, where general actions which concern all, and are 
maintained by all, are generally debated, argued, sifted and censured by all men without 
contradiction’, and he noted that magistrates ‘seek not the satisfaction of their own wills so 
much, as the general satisfaction of all, where it may be with the good of all’. He also 
explained his constitutional preferences: ‘I should rejoice to see, instead of that monstrous 
head too big for the body, which hath cut itself off, by breaking asunder the fundamental laws 
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and liberties of the state… some prevention invented against change and disunion’.62 For 
Peter, meanwhile, the example of the Dutch led to ideas for things like the use of a ballot box 
to prevent corruption, as well as changes to the practice of elections: 
 
In the choice of a parliament man, if a thousand meet to choose, let these choose an 
hundred out of that number to choose for them, and the rest depart, the one hundred 
then out of themselves choose 20, to choose one for that service, and these upon oath 
to be faithful, if among these, two be in competition, then to balloting. 
 
Indeed, Peter argued that:  
 
if these plain and just rules of God’s word were observed, there would be no need of 
any deceitful, base and Machiavellian courses, to keep a commonwealth in peace and 
obedience, as may be seen in the Low Countries, where no people have more liberty 
than they, nor pay such great taxations, nor so little state anywhere used to preserve 
authority, and yet the people of so many nations, and religions live in the greatest 
peace, and plenty of the world, merely by good justice, mercy and religion.63 
 
Such evidence might be thought to have taken us some way from Lilburne. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that Lilburne and his fellow Levellers were much more beholden 
to the example of the United Provinces than historians have recognised. In Overton’s 
Remonstrance of Many Thousand Citizens of 1646, therefore, it was explicitly argued that the 
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Dutch provided a model for how to maintain an army without the need for impressment; that 
the Dutch model worked because it was a republic; and that England should ‘copy the 
Hollanders our provident neighbours’. As Overton explained, moreover, practical reforms 
were linked to constitutional models: ‘if we would in many things follow their good example, 
and make this nation a state, free from the oppression of kings, and the corruption of the 
court, and show love to the people in the constitution of your government, the affection of the 
people would satisfy all common and public occasions’. Indeed, Overton made explicit 
reference to the Dutch model for Leveller ideas about representation and accountability, by 
arguing that ‘we are your principals, and you are agents’, and by suggesting that Parliament’s 
power derived from the people’s ‘trust and choice’.64 With this language of ‘principals’, 
indeed, Overton showed clear awareness of a Dutch political system whereby the authorities 
in the States General were beholden to provincial states, and whereby even provincial 
governments relied upon the consent of, and instructions from, their ‘principals’ in particular 
towns. As such, it is possible to argue that Leveller ideas were more or less directly modelled 
on the Dutch constitution, not least in terms of the kind of local self-government that the 
Levellers advocated in the so-called ‘earnest petition’, whereby: 
 
some chosen representatives of every parish proportionably may be the electors of the 
sheriffs, JPs, committee men, grand jury men, and all ministers of justice whatsoever, 
in the respective counties, and that so such minister of justice may continue in his 
office above one whole year, without a new election.65 
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 IV 
 
According to one of Thomas Scott’s spies, Lilburne boasted that he had ‘good intercourse 
with Holland’, and it is now possible to reflect on what he meant, and what this means for our 
understanding of Anglo-Dutch political culture in the mid-seventeenth century.66 It no longer 
seems possible, therefore, merely to treat Lilburne’s brief spell in the Low Countries as an 
awkward interlude, when he merely sought to continue his English political campaigning, and 
when he dabbled with royalism. This is partly because, as scholars now recognise, ‘royalism’ 
is an awkward category. It seems clear, therefore, not just that royalists were deeply divided 
over both principles and tactics, but also that many parliamentarians found themselves closer 
to a version of royalism as time passed, and that certain individuals changed sides more than 
once, without really changing their political ideas.67 In this situation, it is possible to accept 
that Lilburne’s position was complicated by his experience of exile, and that, having 
concluded that the actions of the Rump regime – including the king’s trial – were illegal, he 
was prepared to work with other enemies of the republic. Nevertheless, we should not place 
too much weight upon the strength of Lilburne’s relationship with royalists in the early 
1650s, just as we might need to reassess the links that emerged between royalist plotters and 
ex-Levellers during the protectorate. We should instead recognise that Lilburne’s position in 
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exile – and the tactics of Thomas Scott’s spies – made it important for him not just to 
continue his attacks on Cromwell, but also to protect himself from ‘ranting cavaliers’, and to 
persuade the Dutch people of his good intentions, particularly as England and the United 
Provinces slid towards war. 
 It is this delicate situation that explains Lilburne’s innovative use of bilingual print 
and Anglo-Dutch pamphleteering, which involved doing much more than merely exploiting 
the well-known opportunities offered by the Dutch system to produce pamphlets for 
audiences in England. Indeed, what is striking about Lilburne’s tactics during the 1650s is not 
just his recognition of the need to speak to multiple English audiences, but also his 
willingness to address readers within and even beyond the Low Countries, far beyond the 
community of royalist exiles. More importantly, this outward-looking strategy also involved 
more than just a pragmatic desire for self-preservation, and the need to ingratiate himself with 
Dutchmen who may have suspected his motives. It was also linked to Lilburne’s respect for 
Dutch society and Dutch political culture, and if Lilburne’s reflections on what he 
encountered in the United Provinces were somewhat brief, they were nevertheless compatible 
with a strand of English radical thought – and with other Leveller texts – which regarded it as 
an ‘exemplar republic’. This is a theme that has generally been overlooked by historians of 
republicanism and radicalism, who generally focus on thinkers – like James Harrington and 
Algernon Sidney – who more or less explicitly rejected the Dutch model.68 What Harrington 
and Sidney rejected, however, was precisely what the Levellers valued: a federal republic in 
which power was radically decentralised, and in which sovereignty was genuinely popular. 
Historians have only recently begun to appreciate the degree to which Leveller ideas were 
predicated on democratic local self-government, and it is thus important to emphasise that 
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such ideas were influenced in no small part by observing the workings of the Dutch 
republic.69 As such, it is possible to argue that while Lilburne and the Levellers may have 
been proud Englishmen, loyal to the liberties of freeborn Englishmen, they were also willing 
to respect, learn from and emulate their European neighbours, and also to participate in the 
Dutch public sphere. 
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